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DOMESTIC INFLUENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
JORDAN J. PAUST*
Over fifty years ago, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) was
created to provide advisory opinions for various U.N. entities and to
decide certain state-to-state disputes.' Advisory opinions, as the phrase
suggests, were to be merely advisory;2 and under Article 59 of the
Statute of the I.C.J., even a decision of the Court concerning state-to-
state complaints was to have "no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case." 3 As text-writers affirm,
the formal preclusion of stare decisis with respect to decisions of the
Court "and the relegation of judicial decisions generally to a 'subsidiary
status' [concerning the sources and evidences of international law4]
reflect the reluctance of states to accord courts.. .a law-making role."5
Nonetheless, decisions and advisory opinions of the International
Court of Justice have generally been widely received as authoritative
explications of international law.6 Buttressed by cautious attention to
*Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston; Edward Ball Eminent Scholar
Chair in International Law, Florida State University.
1. See STATUTE OF THE I.C.J. arts. 34, 36, 59-60, 65; U.N. CHARTER art. 96;
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 903.1 & 903.2
cmts. a & h, reporters' notes 10 & 12 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
2. See STATUTE OF THE I.C.J. art. 65; U.N. CHARTER art. 96; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 903.2 cmt. h, reporters' note 12; MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE-THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
WORLD COMMUNITY 128 (1981) (quoting Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962
I.C.J. 150); FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 721
(1990); COVEY T. OLIVER ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 70 (4th ed. 1995);
DANIEL G. PARTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCESS 247-48 (1992).
3. See STATUTE OF THE I.C.J. art. 59; see also McDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 2,
at 1536-38 (indicating that some national courts do not automatically enforce I.C.J.
judgments, but treat them like foreign judgments); U.N. CHARTER art. 94 (noting that
there is a duty "to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any
case to which it is a party'); President of the I.C.J. Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Reception by
National Courts of Decisions of International Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 21, 25-26 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds.,
1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS].
4. See STATUTE OF THE 1.C.J. art. 38.1(d).
5. See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 120 (1993); NEWMAN ET AL., supra
note 2, at 722.
6. See, e.g., HENKIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 120-21; NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at
722; PARTAN, supra note 2, at 3; Bedjaoui, supra note 3, at 26-35 (regarding effects and
"reception" of I.C.J. decisions and opinions); Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox,
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the Court's authority and patterns of opinio juris they help to shape,
decisions and advisory opinions have acquired a functional significance
far beyond what printed constitutive articles might have allowed.
Indeed, despite formal abhorrence of stare decisis, the Court, as nearly
any other, has dared to cite itself and has often incorporated the
reasoning from other cases by reference.7
This growth in authority and influence is generally recognized,8 but
the decision of the United States in 1985 to withdraw from the general
jurisdictional competence of the Court 9 must partly hamper such
developments. Also inhibiting the development are a series of U.S.
reservations to human rights treaties. With respect to I.C.J.
adjudication of issues arising out of such a treaty, a typical U.S.
reservation declares that the U.S. will agree to I.C.J. jurisdiction if, at
some future time, the U.S. actually does agree.10 Such a reservation
relegates the role of the Court to an ad hoc adjudicatory process
whenever the United States is involved, and it is partly self-defeating
for the United States. Given the decision of the Court in the Case of
Certain Norwegian Loans," the U.S. reservations may preclude use of
Introduction: Transnational Judicial Synergy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN
NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 3, at 6-7; Sarita Ordonez & David Reilly, Effect of the
Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice on National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 3, at 338, 343, 345-69; Christoph
Schreuer, The Authority of International Judicial Practice in Domestic Courts, 23 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 681 (1974); Egon Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and the Human
Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 350-51 (1972). For use of I.C.J.
decisions in other countries, see, e.g., Bedjaoui, supra note 3, at 30-35; Jochen Frowein,
remarks, panel on International Law in Domestic Legal Orders: A Comparative
Perspective, 91 AM. SOC. INT'L L., 56 (1997); Yuji Iwasawa, remarks, id. Cf. McDOUGAL &
REISMAN, supra note 2, at 78 & n.* (stating that Article 38 of the STATUTE OF THE I.C.J.
does not fully portray realistic roles), 103 (identifying the actual authority of U.N.
entities), 142-44 (indicating the growth of the expansive authority of I. C.J.).
7. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 903, reporters' note 8; BARRY E. CARTER &
PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (2d ed. 1995); HENKIN ET AL., supra note 5,
at 121; NEWMAN ET AL.., supra note 6, at 722; Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 6, at 338, 343.
8. See supra note 6; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 903, reporters' note 11
('The judgments of the Court have been generally complied with .. "); cf. OLIVER ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 78-79 (indicating noncompliance by some states); HENRY J. STEINER ET
AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 182-86 (4th ed. 1994) (same).
9. See 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 903 cmt. c, reporters' note
3.
10. See RICHARD B. LILLICH, HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 268-69 (3d ed. 1995) (indicating reservations to
Genocide Convention and International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Race Discrimination); NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 404; PARTAN, supra note 2, at 528-
29. This sort of reservation has been objected to by other states. See, e.g., LILLICH &
HANNUM, supra at 269; Bedjaoui, supra note 6, at 27 (stating the consequences of the
Vandenberg Reservation).
11. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6). Therein, the
general principle recognized was that reciprocal use of limitations of acceptance of the
jurisdictional competence of the Court should pertain by analogy to limitations placed in a
VOL. 26:5
DOMESTIC INFLUENCE
the I.C.J. by the United States to redress human rights claims of U.S.
nationals against foreign governments. Nevertheless, the United
States is also a signatory to over seventy multilateral treaties and
thirty bilateral treaties that contain special declarations of acceptance
of I.C.J. jurisdiction that do not require additional consent to
competence. 12 Thus, the prospect of increased U.S. participation in
litigation before the Court remains, even if such participation is likely
to be treaty or subject-specific.
Has the general growth of authority and influence of the
International Court, despite certain inhibiting practices of the U.S.
political branches, had any impact domestically within U.S. judicial
processes? Despite the lack of any direct relevance domestically of
I.C.J. opinions advising U.N. entities, the rarity of state-to-state
disputes appearing directly or obliquely in U.S. courts, a formally
proclaimed lack of "binding force" of I.C.J. decisions outside the parties
to a dispute, and the embarrassing fact that most U.S. lawyers and
judges have never taken a course in international law, have I.C.J.
decisions and opinions had any influence within our domestic legal
processes? Perhaps surprisingly, ineluctably, they have.
In sharp contrast to the general influence of I.C.J. decisions and
advisory opinions within the United States, however, is the severely
limited role for I.C.J. judgments recognized by the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Committee of United
States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan.13 In its 1988 opinion,
the D.C. Circuit nearly slammed the door on any direct enforcement of
I.C.J. judgments in U.S. courts. Still, general use of I.C.J. decisions and
opinions as authoritative indicia of identifiable international law
remains strong.
Plaintiffs had been various private parties seeking, however
indirectly, the enforcement of the 1986 decision of the I.C.J. against the
United States with respect to U.S. activities in Nicaragua and support
of the Contras. Such plaintiffs, the Circuit Court declared, lacked
standing concerning the claims alleged and Article 94 of the U.N.
Charter, which allows a party to a case "recourse to the Security
Council" for enforcement of a judgment, 14 "simply does not confer rights
reservation to an I.C.J. clause contained within a multilateral or bilateral treaty. Id.
12. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 903 cmt. c; See Louis Henkin ET AL., supra
note 5, at 809-10; Sarita Ordonez & David Reilly, supra note 6, at 341 & n.37 (stating
that U.S. is a signatory to approximately 60% of more than 260 such treaties); see also
OLIVER ET AL.., supra note 2, at 46 (over 250 treaties provide special acceptance); PARTAN,
supra note 2, at 10.
13. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
14. U.N. CHARTER art. 94(2).
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on private individuals."15 "Because only nations can be parties before
the ICJ," the court added, the plaintiff-appellants "are not 'parties'
within the meaning" of paragraph 2 of Article 94, since it clearly "does
not contemplate that individuals having no relationship to the ICJ case
should enjoy a private right to enforce the ICJ's decision."'16 The court
continued:
Our interpretation of Article 94 is buttressed by a related provision in
the Statute of the ICJ, which... provides that "[t]he decision of the
Court has no binding fore except between the parties and in respect of
th[e] particular case."... Taken together, these Charter clauses make
clear that the purpose of establishing the ICJ was to resolve disputes
between national governments. We find in these clauses no intent to
vest citizens who reside in a U.N. member nation with authority to
enforce an ICJ decision against their own government. 17
Its conclusion was that "[n]either individuals nor organizations
have a cause of action in an American court to enforce ICJ
judgments." 8
Thus, direct enforcement of a state-to-state judgment by private
individuals might seemingly be precluded. 19 Yet, the court did not
address the possibility of a suit brought by a foreign state to enforce an
I.C.J. judgment, which would present different issues concerning
immunity20 and the enforcement of non-U.S. judgments in U.S. courts.21
15. Comm. of United States Citizens, 859 F.2d at 937.
16. Id. at 938.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 934 ('The ICJ is a creation of national governments, working through the
U.N.; its decisions operate between and among such governments and are not enforceable
by individuals having no relation to the claim that the ICJ has adjudicated-in this case,
a claim brought by the government of Nicaragua.'). The Circuit Court also found that,
under the last-in-time rule, subsequent congressional legislation could override U.N.
Charter obligations domestically. Id. at 936-37. It stated that federal statutes could also
override customary norms. Id. at 938-39. There is a split in authority over this
controversial point, with the preference for the primacy of custom having the edge. See,
e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 89-95 passim
(1996). It also decided that a U.S. obligation to comply with an I.C.J. judgment is not jus
cogens. Comm. of United States Citizens, 859 F.2d at 939-41.
19. Although the Court stressed that it was dealing with plaintiffs "having no
relation to the claim" before the ICJ, supra note 18, at 934, "no relationship to the ICJ
case," see supra text accompanying note 16, and with plaintiffs having merely some
related claims "against their own government," see supra text accompanying note 17, the
primary focus of the rationale was on a distinction between state claimants before the ICJ
and private individuals or groups. Comm. of United States Citizens, 859 F.2d. at 938-941.
20. These could include issues with respect to immunity of the United States, the
President of the United States, other federal officials, or a foreign government or entity.
Concerning the latter, see the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1602-1611 (1998). With respect to a sitting President, see, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731 (1982). With respect to nonimmunity for violations of international law, see, e.g.,
PAUST, supra note 18, at 8, 105, 205, 208, 210-11, 215, 232, 276-79, 283-84, 291-92, 348,
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The Court, although stressing that the private plaintiffs before it had
"no relationship to the ICJ case," seemed unaware of the fact that in
some instances the underlying claims before an international tribunal
are ultimately those of private parties who are being represented at the
international level by their government. In the latter case, the
Supreme Court has already recognized that, even though claims before
an international tribunal are technically those of governments, private
litigants can have a claim of right under relevant international law and
the "award" of the tribunal, and such a right is undoubtedly
"susceptible of judicial determination."22 It seems logical, then, that if
an I.C.J. decision is favorable with respect to underlying claims of
private parties, the private parties should have an opportunity to utilize
the judgment in domestic legal processes.
Far more significant have been the many indirect U.S. judicial uses
of I.C.J. decisions and advisory opinions in order to identify and clarify
relevant international law. Since the creation of the International
Court, forty-two cases in federal courts23 have applied fifteen I.C.J.
405-09, 413, 416-18, 471-72; Jordan J. Paust, It's No Defense: Nullum Crimen,
International Crime and the Gingerbread Man, 60 ALB. L. REV. 657, 658-62 (1997).
Concerning suits against the United States, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (a) & (b), 1491,
2671-2680 (1998). Concerning suits in U.S. courts brought by foreign states, see, e.g., U.S.
CONST. art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1 (arising under), cl. 2 (federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1332 (a)(4) (1998) (diversity), 1607 (1998) (counterclaims against a foreign state
plaintiff).
21. Concerning enforcement of foreign judgments, see, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113 (1895); Ramirez v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 467(1996) (28 U.S.C. § 1491 does not
provide Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction over claim seeking recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment against the U.S.); 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (assistance to foreign
and international tribunals, which does not include enforcement of judgments). See, e.g.,
Tacul, S.A. v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., 693 F. Supp. 1399 (D. Conn. 1988); In
re Civil Rogatory Letters Filed by Consulate, 640 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Tex. 1986); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2414 (enforcement of judgments against the U.S. and discretion of the U.S. Attorney
General); FED. R. CIV. P. 9(e) (pleading of foreign judgment); RESTATEMENT, supra note
1, §§ 481-482 & chpt. 8, introductory n. at 591-93; STEINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 713-15,
740-41; Uniform Foreign Money - Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L. ANN. 263 (Master
ed. 1986), reprinted in STEINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 727-28. Alien plaintiffs may have
a claim utilizing an I.C.J. judgment as evidence of international law and its breach under
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
22. La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 457-58 (1899). See also
26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907) (indicating that the International Boundary
Commission decision applies directly to disputes between governments but can be utilized
in domestic litigation involving private parties); PAUST, supra note 18, at 274-75 n.541
(describing that claims before the I.C.J. can ultimately be those of individuals), 290-91
n.604 (showing that the same general points evidenced even in P.C.I.J. decisions);
THORPE, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 58-60 (1924); see supra notes 31, 41 and accompanying
text.
23. The cases are cited infra notes 27-28, 31-34, 36-45, 47-48. Not listed among the
forty-two is a Court of Claims decision addressing the need to interpret a treaty by using
the ordinary meaning of terms used in the text of a treaty. See Coplin v. United States, 6
Cl. Ct. 115, 126 n.12 (1984), citing 1950 Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the
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decisions or advisory opinions as evidence of international normative
content. 24  Within the federal judiciary, such uses have appeared
somewhat more frequently in U.S. circuit courts. There have in fact
been six relevant uses in the Supreme Court, 25 nineteen uses in the
circuit courts,26 sixteen uses in the district courts, and one citation in
the Court of Trade. Utilization of I.C.J. decisions or opinions appears
most often in the text of a judicial opinion, and they appear far less
frequently merely in a footnote. Further, utilization has most often
appeared in main opinions, with use in only four dissenting opinions27
(or in some ten per cent of the cases). Citations to two I.C.J. decisions
or opinions appear in only two federal cases, 28 the rest of the federal
cases contain just one citation. With respect to frequencies of use in
given decades, most significant uses appear during the 1980's. There
were five cases in the 1990's, twenty-four in the 1980's, four in the
1970's, seven in the 1960's, and only two in the 1950's. Thus, trends in
frequency of use demonstrate a greater use of I.C.J. decisions and
opinions for normative guidance in the last two decades.
The types of I.C.J. decisions and opinions utilized include ten state-
to-state cases and five advisory opinions ranging in dates from 1949 to
1988.29 Most of these did not directly involve actions or responsibilities
of the United States, although nearly half did. This is not surprising
given the general use of I.C.J. decisions and opinions to identify and
clarify international law, especially customary international law, that is
relevant to a case or controversy brought before a U.S. court.30 The
types of international norms addressed have been varied,
demonstrating a general relevance of I.C.J. decisions and opinions and
a lack of special or peculiar patterns of use with respect to subject
matter.
General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8
(Mar. 3).
24. The fifteen I.C.J. decisions or advisory opinions are listed in Appendix I.
25. See notes 31, 33, 45, 48 infra. The Justices were: Black, Blackmun, Harlan,
O'Connor, Stevens, and Stewart.
26. More frequent use appears in the D.C. Circuit (8 cases), followed by the Ninth (5
cases), Fifth (2 cases), Seventh (2 cases), First (1 case), and Eighth (1 case) Circuits.
27. See Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1180, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J.,
dissenting); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 1981) (Reavley, J.,
dissenting); Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting);
Rogers v. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.,
278 F.2d 268 (1960) (Fahy, J., dissenting). All of the dissents are in circuit court cases.
28. See Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d at 1180, 1184 (Wald, J., dissenting) (Advisory
Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention and Barcelona Traction); Trelles
Cruz v. Zapata Ocean Resources, 695 F.2d 428, 433 & ns. 8-9 (9th Cir. 1982) (Nottebohm
and U.N. Reparations).
29. See Appendix I.
30. See PAUST, supra note 18, at 1-50 (showing the nature, proof, and utilization of
customary international law as law of the United States).
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A favorite cite in the federal courts is the 1970 Barcelona Traction
Light & Power Company case, cited in seven federal cases. Next in
apparent attraction is the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, with
citations in six cases, and the Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, with four citations to the
decision on the merits and two cites to the Order for Provisional
Measures. Two advisory opinions, the Advisory Opinion on Reparations
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations and the
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia, are tied for fourth with four
citations each. The Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States) has
citations in three federal cases, and the rest of the I.C.J. decisions or
opinions have either two or merely one citation.
Barcelona Traction is actually cited with respect to two general
clusters of international prescription: (1) international rules concerning
corporations (e.g., that the nationality of a corporation is the state
where incorporation takes place, that only the state of nationality can
represent the corporation at the international level, and that corporate
form can be disregarded in some cases or does not obviate relevant
liability of a state),31 and (2) obligatio erga omnes (especially with
respect to basic human rights and the prohibition of genocide) and the
fact that they are the concern of all states and can sometimes be related
to peremptory norms jus cogens.32 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, the next
most frequently cited case, is cited with respect to the nature and
delimitations of the territorial sea and other sea areas. 33 The Case
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran is
cited in recognition of the fact that Iran's actions in connection with the
continued occupation of the U.S. embassy and hostage-taking violated
international law and that treaties between the two countries
31. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 628 n.20 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) ("separate status of an incorporated entity may be
disregarded in certain exceptional circumstances'); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("separate corporate existence does not shield the
state from liability"); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 365 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Reavley, J., dissenting) (international law uses place of incorporation for the nationality
of a corporation); Looper v. Morgan, 1995 WL 499816, at 50-51 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (only the
state of nationality of a corporation can represent it at the international level).
32. Two cases: Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d at 1180, 1184 (Wald, J., dissenting);
Siderman De Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992). Also see
generally Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 6, at 367.
33. See United States v. Maine, et al., 475 U.S. 89, 98 (1986) (Stevens, J.) (use of
strait baselines upheld in part because of historic claim and occupation); United States v.
Louisiana, 470 U.S. 93, 107 n.10 (1985) (Blackmun, J.) (delimitation of baselines,
especially with reference to island fringes); United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 43
n.55, 69-70 (1969) (Stewart, J.) (same); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 869 (5th
Cir. 1979) (limits of extension of the territorial sea); Island Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 352 F.2d
735, 741 (9th Cir. 1965) (historic waters acquired partly by control); CAB v. Island
Airlines, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 990, 1003-04 & ns.23-24, 1005 & n.27 (D. Hawaii 1964) (same).
7931998
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nevertheless remained in force.34 The Namibia Advisory Opinion is
cited in U.S. courts either concerning the consequences of the opinion in
southern Africa or to demonstrate that human rights are of
international concern and that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights 35 is an authoritative aid for the identification and clarification of
basic human rights. 36 The U.N. Reparations Advisory Opinion, tied for
fourth place in frequency of citations, is cited concerning the legal
personality of the United Nations as well as for the proposition that,
although a general norm proclaims that a state may not present a claim
on behalf of another state, there are exceptions to the rule.37 The
Interhandel Case, weighing in with three citations, is cited concerning
the need to exhaust local remedies and exceptions to such a rule where
local remedies would be unfair or futile.38
The 1986 I.C.J.. decision in Nicaragua v. United States is cited
concerning the decision of the Court and the attempt by private groups
to assure enforcement, and for the general point that widely accepted
treaties often reflect customary international law. 39 The 1984 Gulf of
34. See Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 837, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(violation and crimes); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 585 (9th Cir.
1983) (violation); United States v. Central Corp., 1987 WL 20129, at 8 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
("treaty remained in effect during the 1979-80 Iran-United States 'hostage crisis");
National Airmotive v. Government and State of Iran, 491 F. Supp. 555, 556 (D. D.C. 1980)
(violation). Arising from the same controversy between the United States and Iran, the
1979 Order of the I.C.J. granting Provisional Measures was cited in Agee v. Muskie, 629
F.2d 80, 90, 116 n.79 (appendix) (D.C. Cir. 1980) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) and Narenji
v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("lawlessness of this conduct of the Iranian
government was recognized by the decision of the World Court"). See generally Ordonez &
Reilly, supra note 6, at 353-55.
35. G.A. Res. 217A III, 3 U.N. GAOR, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
36. See Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (consequences);
United States-South West Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States
Dept. of State, 90 F.R.D. 695, 696 n.2 (D. D.C. 1981) (consequences); Rodriguez Fernandez
v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 797 (D. Kan. 1980) ("Declaration has evolved into an
important source of international human rights law"); In re Alien, MDL No. 398, 501 F.
Supp. 544, 591 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (human rights are of international concern).
37. See Trelles Cruz v. Zapata Ocean Resources, 695 F.2d 428, 433 & n.9 (9th Cir.
1982) (exceptions to the rule of nonrepresentation); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1187 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (re: U.N. legal personality);
United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67, 81, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (same); Balfour, Guthrie
& Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831, 834 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1950) (U.N. is separate legal
entity). See generally Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 6, at 364 & n.164.
38. See Rogers v. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A., 278 F.2d 268, 273 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Fahy, J., dissenting) (merely
cited as part of the history of the case); Greenpeace, Inc. v. France, 946 F. Supp. 773, 783
(C.D. Cal. 1996); American Int'l Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 525
(D. D.C. 1980).
39. See Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929, 932, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Arcoren v. Peters, 811 F.2d 392, 397 n.11 (8th Cir. 1987)
("widely accepted treaty obligations often reflect the requirements of customary
international law").
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Maine decision is cited in recognition of the decision of the International
Court concerning allocation of sea areas and various points in pleadings
before the Court. 40 The Nottebohm Case is cited concerning appropriate
tests of nationality under international law and the general rule that a
state cannot rightly present a claim at the international level on behalf
of non-nationals. 41 The 1959 Advisory Opinion on South West Africa is
cited concerning limitations extant with respect to state sovereignty in
connection with a League of Nations mandate or U.N. trusteeship
system, especially regarding human rights of the inhabitants. 42
The remaining five I.C.J. decisions or opinions, with only one
citation each, address an array of legal precepts. The 1988 Advisory
Opinion on Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate is cited in order
to distinguish a case addressed by the federal judiciary from those
disputes that must proceed to arbitration under the U.N. Headquarters
Agreement.43 The French Nuclear Test Cases are cited concerning the
nature of the Exclusive Economic Zone and coastal state competence
therein merely to exercise limited control for the purpose of exploring
and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources. 44 The
1952 decision in France v. United States is cited for the proposition that
"[t]he word 'disputes' has been interpreted by the International Court of
Justice to comprehend criminal as well as civil disputes."45  The
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention was cited
as evidence of the fact that the principles underlying the Genocide
Convention 46 are customary international law. 47 Finally, the 1949
Corfu Channel Case is cited for the rule that a coastal state cannot
40. See Conservation Law Found. of New Eng. v. Secretary of the Interior, 790 F.2d
965, 967 (1st Cir. 1986) (decision); Massachusetts v. Clark, 594 F. Supp. 1373, 1387-88 n.8
(D. Mass. 1984) (points in pleadings).
41. See Trelles Cruz, 695 F.2d at 433 & n.8 (general rule concerning representation at
international levels); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1188 n.14 (7th Cir. 1980) (residence
is not controlling re: nationality-in fact, one needs a stronger nexus with the state).
42. See McComish v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 580 F.2d 1323, 1329 (9th
Cir. 1978); Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 639 F. Supp. 706, 715 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
43. See United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1461-62, 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See
generally Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 6, at 357-58.
44. See Koru North America v. United States, 701 F. Supp. 229, 232 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988). The Court of International Trade was in error, however, when it considered that
the EEZ involves "nothing more than a preferential fishing zone." Id.
45. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 61 (1957) (Black, J.).
46. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; G.A. Res. 2670, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)). On the reach of the
Genocide Convention and customary aspects, see, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST ET. AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1081-1112 (1996).
47. See Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting).
Actually, the entire proscription of genocide is customary international law, as well as a
prohibition jus cogens, see, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at 293, 300-05; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, § 702 cmt. n, reporters' note 3.
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"claim a strait as inland water if, in its natural state, it served as a
useful" international highway.48
Also of interest is the fact that the precursor to the I.C.J., the
Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) under the League of
Nations, has been cited in eighteen federal cases from the 1930s to the
1990s. Like references to the I.C.J., most utilization of the P.C.I.J.
decisions involves the identification and clarification of customary
international law. During this period, there have been citations to eight
P.C.I.J. decisions.49 Not unlike the general pattern of use of I.C.J.
decisions and opinions, most of the federal cases citing the P.C.I.J.
appear in the 1980s (nine cases) 5° and only one cite appears in the
1990s. P.C.I.J. citations occur in two Supreme Court cases, twelve
circuit court cases,5 1 and four district court cases. Like I.C.J. citations,
most P.C.I.J. cites are in opinions of the court-with only one in a
dissenting opinion, and that in a federal case citing the same P.C.I.J.
decision in the opinion of the federal court.52 Two cases involved
citations in argument by counsel. 53
The P.C.I.J. case most frequently cited is the S.S. Lotus. It is cited
in eleven cases with respect to customary international legal principles
concerning jurisdiction. 54 The S.S. Wimbleton is cited in one case
48. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 172 (1965) (Harlan, J.).
49. See Appendix II.
50. Use in various time periods are: 1990's (one case), 1980's (nine cases), 1970's (one
case), 1960's (four cases), 1950's (one case), 1940's (no cases), 1930's (two cases, arguments
of counsel-see infra note 50).
51. These appear in fairly equal numbers in the Second, Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits (in 4, 3, 2, and 3 cases respectively).
52. See First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government of Ant. & Barb., 877 F.2d 189, 192
(2d Cir. 1989); id. at 198 n.1 (Newman, J., dissenting). Both opinions cited Legal Status
of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), 1933 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 53, for the
proposition that, in certain circumstances, a state can be bound by its officials'
unauthorized actions.
53. See Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329, 343 (1937) (citing Serbian Loans);
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 249, 277 (1935) (citing The Serbian
Loans and The Brazilian Loans).
54. See Kreimerman v. Veerkamp, 22 F.3d 634, 639 nn.17-18 (5th Cir. 1994)
(jurisdiction and international restrictions on states); Laker Airways Lyd. v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 922 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same); In re Marc Rich &
Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); United States v. Marino-
Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982) (jurisdiction and law of the sea); United
States v. Riker, 670 F.2d 987, 988 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-
Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1314 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (jurisdiction); United
States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 878 (5th Cir. 1979) (jurisdiction and law of the sea); Pacific
Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 814 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(jurisdiction), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882,
885 n.4 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that no jurisdiction to enforce exists unless there is
jurisdiction to prescribe under international law; on this point, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, § 431); In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 555 (N.D. Ohio 1985)
(extraterritorial jurisdiction); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 489 (S.D. Cal.
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concerning the same principles.5 5 The Factory at Chorzow is cited in
three cases with respect to the valuation of and remedies for
expropriated property of aliens,56 as is the Polish Upper Silesia case,
cited in one federal opinion.57 Both the Serbian Loans and Brazilian
Loans cases were cited concerning "gold value" clauses or obligations;58
and The Oscar Chinn Case was cited in two federal cases for two points:
(1) that there should be no national origin discrimination or
discrimination against aliens with respect to expropriation of property,
and (2) that the valuation of and payment concerning expropriated
property should involve fair, prompt, and adequate compensation. 59
Finally, use of the Eastern Greenland case involved recognition that in
certain circumstances a state can be bound by representations of its
officials where their lack of authority is not obvious.60
A few state court opinions have also used I.C.J. decisions or
opinions on points of international law. 61 In one case, the Supreme
Court of New York of New York County noted that in 1980 the I.C.J.
had confirmed the continued validity of the Treaty of Amity with Iran.62
The same court noted earlier that the I.C.J. had decided that an oil
company's contract with Saudi Arabia "cannot be given the status of a
treaty."63 Additionally, an advisory opinion of the Court was cited by a
dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in recognition
1960) (same). Also see generally Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 6, at 366. On international
law concerning jurisdiction to prescribe and to enforce, see, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at
387-412.
55. See Kreimerman v. Veerkamp, 22 F.3d 634, 639 nn.17-18 (5th Cir. 1994).
56. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 888 (2d
Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 863 n.11 (2d Cir. 1962);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 431, 446 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
57. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, 307 F.2d at 863 n.11.
58. See Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329, 343 (1937) (argument of U.S. Solicitor
General); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 249, 277 (1935) (arguments
of counsel); Lemaire v. Kentucky & Indiana Terminal R.R. Co., 140 F. Supp. 82, 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
59. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, 307 F.2d at 867 (holding that international law does
not permit national origin or alienage discrimination); Banco Nacional de Cuba, 505 F.
Supp. at 431 (discussing the value of expropriated property).
60. See First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Gov't of Ant. & Barb., 877 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir.
1989); id. at 198 n.1 (Newman, J., dissenting).
61. See Raji v. Bank Sepah-Iran, 139 Misc. 2d 1026, 1028, 529 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 23 Misc. 2d 446, 451; 190
N.Y.S.2d 218, 223-24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); Navios Corp. v. Nat'l Maritime Union, 402 Pa.
325, 347-48, 350; 166 A.2d 625, 636 (1960) (Bell, J., dissenting). For two other cases
merely mentioning that the United Nations has an I.C.J, see People v. Wright, 12 Misc. 2d
961, 964, 173 N.Y.S.2d 160, 164 (N.Y. Ct. Spec. Sess. 1958); Beley v. Pennsylvania Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 251, 95 A.2d 202, 218 (1953) (Musmanno,J., concurring).
62. See Bank Sepah-Iran, 139 Misc. 2d at 1028.
63. See American Jewish Congress, 23 Misc. 2d at 451 (citing Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
(U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22)).
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that "the registry and flag of Liberia are entitled to the same national
status accorded the registry and flag of any other nation" concerning
the registry of vessels.64 One state court, the Third District Court of
Appeal of Florida, cited the P.C.I.J. while quoting the so-called Tate
Letter of an Acting Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State. The
P.C.I.J. case cited was the S.S. Lotus. It was cited for the proposition
that customary international law does not recognize "immunity when
the foreign government engages in commerce.... ,,65
The general patterns of use of I.C.J. and P.C.I.J. decisions are
informing. Despite a supposed lack of stare decisis and the U.S.
withdrawal from a general jurisdictional competence of the
International Court, international judicial decisions play a significant
role in United States courts. They are often used as authoritative
evidence of the content of customary international law and, at times,
are used as authoritative interpretation of international agreements.
In both instances, there has been attention to international decisions
addressing a wide array of normative subjects; and in no federal case
has there been any questioning of such an authority.
For a few people, these patterns must be fairly disturbing. If one is
an enemy of customary international law (a choice that, in my view, will
not inure to one's benefit in the history of humanity), this growing
influence of the International Court must be frightening. Such
influence occurs without complete control by the Executive and, like the
influence of much of international law for more than 200 years, with
seeming indifference to the House of Representatives. More generally,
some complain that customary international law, highly valued by our
Founders 66 and the most democratic form of international law, is
somehow antidemocratic. 67  Exactly which customary laws are
64. See Navios Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 402 Pa. at 347-48, 350 (citing
Advisory Opinion on Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 1960 I.C.J. 150 (June 8)).
65. See Harris & Co. Advertising v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687, 690-91 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961), quoting The Tate Letter, May 19, 1952, 26 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL.
984 (1952), citing S.S. Lotus, P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 29.
66. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at vii, 1, 5-6, 8, 10 n.1, 15-17, 34-37, 47-50, 120-23
n.55, 139 n.96, 144-45, 154-55 nn.1-13, 170-76, 182-83, 214-24 passim. Cf. id. at 132-33
n.81.
67. Compare PAUST, supra note 18, at 2-3, 11 n.4, 13-14 nn.1O-13, with Curtis A.
Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 821, 857-59, 868, 871 (1997), and
Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 665, 707-09, 713-16, 721-23, 731 (1986). Despite the title, Professor Trimble's
"revisionist" view would actually involve a radical departure from historic use of
customary international law, views of the Founders, and predominant expectations since
the formation of the United States. It also seeks acceptance of illegality, apparently any
illegality, under a euphemistic phrase "accommodating change" and a compliant judiciary
abdicating its constitutional role under Articles III and VI of the U.S. Constitution.
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supposedly threatening to our democracy, however, have not been
identified 6 8-- certainly none of those utilized by our courts for more than
200 years. Such laws have been many and have addressed numerous
subjects, involving rights, competencies and duties, and both private
and public actors here and abroad.69 Given the primary constitutional
bases for incorporation of customary international law in the phrase
"laws of the United States" found in Articles III and VI of the U.S.
Constitution 70 and prevailing expectations since the Founders that
customary international law is both directly and indirectly
incorporable, 71 such patterns and trends in use of international law are
Compare Trimble, supra at 707-11, 713-16, 721-23 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 6-8, 18-
19, 46-48, 143-46, 154-60. See also CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 7, at 82-83
(demonstrating that Professor Trimble prefers overturning the preferences of the
Founders, as well as changing the traditional methods of incorporation of customary
international law, and substituting what appears to have been a British system or direct
incorporation only through legislation. Even the British have abandoned transformation
(which, contrary even to Professor Trimble's preference, had allowed adoption by judicial
decision). See, e.g., Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 1 Q.B. 529,
553-54 (1978)). Such a revisionist denial of the judicial role in our domestic legal process
is antithetical to a balance and separation of powers conceived by the Founders and
involving the law of nations, see PAUST, supra note 66; PAUST, supra note 18, at 7-8, 34-
48, 201-02, 264-70 passim. This denial is sought by some as an ideologic weapon against
the efficacy of human rights and, thus inevitably, the preferred consequences of
democracy. Judicial power is an integral part of the constitutional design for the
separation of powers and reflects, in part, "the profound conviction of the Framers that
the powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be most carefully circumscribed," see
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947, 951 (1983). With respect to democratic values, it is
worth emphasizing that no single institutional arrangement necessarily represents
authority of guarantees a democratic functioning or outcome, see PAUST, supra at 462-63;
see also James A.R. Nafziger, Political Dispute Resolution by the World Court, With
Reference to United States Courts, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL.'Y 775 (1998). At any given
time, legislative bodies may merely represent special interests.
68. The closest to a claim concerning specific customary norms is implicit in the
proclaimed worry of Professors Bradley and Goldsmith over, of all things, "a large body of
... human rights" and related prohibitions of genocide and slavery, see Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 832, 841. Despite their concerns (and their use of a number
of historical inaccuracies and fallacies, see infra note 71), there has been significant
attention to a rich and wide array of human rights ever since the formation of the United
States, see, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at 8, 169-203, 214-72, 323-25, passim. Importantly,
Chief Justice Marshall had recognized in 1810 that our judicial tribunals "are established
• .. to decide on human rights .... Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810).
Federal courts had been using human right precepts prior to his affirmation of judicial
authority and responsibility, and have done so ever since.
69. For merely a partial listing of earliest subjects, including human rights, see, e.g., -
PAUST, supra note 18, at 8, 48-50 nn.60-88.
70. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; PAUST, supra note 18,
at 6-8, 34-48.
71. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at 5-50 passim; see also Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL
COURTS, supra note 3, at 16 ("[t]he law of nations is an integral part of... .our']
jurisprudence.'). Given my disagreement with much of the recent work by Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith, and Professor Bradley's participation in this symposium, it is
800 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 26:5
worth highlighting some nineteen points of disagreement and concern. Much of their
reasoning rests on an erroneous premise that customary international law was and is
merely "general common law." See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 820, 823-24,
827, 844, 849. But see PAUST, supra note 18, at 5, 30-33, 176 passim. Because customary
international law is not mere "common law," but part of the "law of the land" and "laws of
the United States" within constitutionally-based judicial authority and responsibility, see
PAUST, supra note 18, at 5-8, 30-50, 176, their nearly obsessive focus on Erie R.R..Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (14 Pet.) 1 (1842), neither of
which addresses international law or has had any demonstrated impact on actual
patterns of federal court use of customary international law, is significantly flawed and
misleading. Additionally, use of what are merely "common law," 'law merchant," or
"maritime" and "admiralty" cases and arguments of others who rely on such cases is
seriously misplaced. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 822, 824, 850
n.222, 851 & nn.230-231, 852-56, 859 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 30-33. The reference
to United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-33 (1812), a case
addressing mere "common law" and making no mention of the law of nations or
international law, is but one example. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at
851 & n.231 (and other cases cited therein) with PAUST, supra note 18, at 32-33, 44-45; Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942) ("From the very beginning of its history this Court
has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations
which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as
well as of enemy individuals."). Indeed, actual patterns of use of customary international
law throughout our history demonstrate that what they term the "modern position," see
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 816-17, 834, 837, 868, was generally endorsed
long ago and has been evidenced fairly consistently in the continuous use of customary
international law by federal courts for more than 200 years. See PAUST, supra note 18, at
1, 5-50, 201-02, 264-70; supra note 68; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at
822-23, 834 n.125, 850-51 & nn.223 & 229-230. Further, what Professor Bradley
considers "new" law regulating "a state's treatment of its own citizens," see Curtis A.
Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts-Before and After
Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL.Y 807 (1998), is not new and is partly what our nation,
and much of the Bill of Rights, was founded upon. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at 5, 8,
34, 95, 142, 169-75, 192-94, 216-23, 248, 324-25, 330-32 passim.
Their disfavored theory requires that "all law applied by federal courts...be
either federal law or state law," Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 852, and
recognition that "if CIL [customary international law] is not federal law, then there is no
basis for the federal judiciary to enforce CIL..." Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at
846. This is their real preference. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 817. If so,
the inescapable fact of continued use of customary international law in the federal courts
and overwhelming patterns of supportive expectation, regardless of CIL's domesticated
name or classification (which clearly has not been merely state law), speak loudly with
respect to the general validity of their theory. Moreover, this use continued after Erie and
its supposedly relevant reasoning. Additionally, if Erie, which is not on point, requires
that mere "common law" have some sort of authorization, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 67, at 852 & n.243 (or, if "governed by the Federal Constitution"), 855-56 & n.263,
that need is met with respect to customary international law and its constitutional bases
in Articles III and VI of the U.S. Constitution, as well as in other constitutional provisions
and various federal statutes (also providing subject matter jurisdiction). See PAUST,
supra note 18, at 5-8, 30-50, 174-75, 186, 192-94, 222, 246-48. An early case had also
expressly related to the duty to incorporate CIL to the Constitution: "courts .... [i]n this
country .... are bound, by the Constitution of the United States, to determine according to
treaties and the law of nations, wherever they apply." Waite v. The Antelope, 28 F. Cas.
1341, 1341 (D.C.D. S. Car. 1807) (No. 17,045).
Other fallacies or errors include statements that customary international law
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lacks supremacy consequences, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 821, 824-
25, 851 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 6-7, 15-16, 36, 42-43, 44 (stating that in all
tribunals CIL is universally binding), 92, 97, 121-22 (indicating that the view of the
Continental Congress noted therein had been similar to Jessup's policy argument,
mentioned in Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 859), 131, 134, 139-40, 179, 182-83,
187, 229, 248 n.391, 333-34, 352, lacked jurisdictional consequences. Compare Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 821 with PAUST, supra note 18 at 8, 34, 42, 45-46, 201-02,
264-70; supra note 68; Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293, 294 (1808); Church v.
Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804); United States v. Peters, District Judge, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 121, 129-32 (1795), and lacked "other consequences of federal law," compare
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 821 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 5-8, 29-50, 143-
46, 154-60, 201-02, 264-70; supra notes 66 (describing views of Founders), 68. A more
informative quotation from THE FEDERALIST No. 3 than that contained in PAUST, supra
note 18, at 34 n.38, is: "Under the national government... the laws of nations, will always
be expounded in one sense. . .[and there is] wisdom... in committing such questions to the
jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national
government." THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 62 (J. Jay) (J.C. Hamilton ed. 1868). If general
common law lacked such consequences and did not bind the states, uses of the law of
nations mentioned in material cited above also stand in opposition to claims that
customary international law was mere common law. Similarly, if "general common law"
"was not considered part of the 'Laws of the United States,'" it is telling that customary
international law certainly was. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at -n.32]
with PAUST, supra note 18, at 6, 40. One case that they cite, actually declares that a
state court "is bound to take notice" of the law of nations, "as...is...the courts of the
United States." See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 824 n.53, Ker v. Illinois, 119
U.S. 436, 444 (1886). Another case cited, actually recognizes that questions of
international law involve concurrent duties since they "must be determined in the first
instance by the court, state or nation, in which the suit is brought," adding that such
questions can be brought in federal courts and the federal court "must decide for itself,
uncontrolled by local decisions." See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 824 n.48,
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892). Concerning New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1875), see PAUST, supra note 18, at 33, 40. In my opinion, Justice
Bradley's dissent was correct that CIL is 'law of the United States" for purposes of
review, see 92 U.S. at 287-88 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 111, reporters' notes 2-3 &
115, cmt. e. In Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440 (1924), the Court
actually ruled that the question was one of "general law applicable alike" and "as fully" to
"suits in state courts as to those prosecuted in the courts of the United States" and should
be "transferred to the [federal] Circuit Court of Appeals." Id. at 442-43. Ker, Huntington,
and Oliver American Trading actually reaffirm that state courts are "bound to take
notice" of and "as fully" to apply CIL. Not one of the cases declares that CIL is not part of
the law to be applied in lower federal courts. Indeed, each recognizes that federal courts
have the same duties as states with respect to cases that originate in federal courts. For
additional recognition that states were bound by the law of nations, see, e.g., Manchester
v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 264 (1891) (ruling that states are bound by law of nations
in defining their boundaries); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 560 (1856)
(McLean, J., dissenting) ("Our States... are independent ... subject only to international
laws."); United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Williamson, 28 F. Cas. 686, 692 (D.C.E.D. Pa.
1855) (No. 16, 726) (each state "is bound by... the 'law of nations.' What it could not do if
freed from federative restrictions, it cannot do now; every restraint upon its
policy.. .binds it still .... ); Thompson v. Doaksum, 68 Cal. 593, 596, 10 P. 199, 201 (1886)
(noting that the obligation to protect private rights under the law of nations "passed to
the new government"); Territory ex rel. Wade v. Ashenfelter, 4 N.M. 93, 148, 12 P. 879
(1887) (holding that New Mexico had a judicial duty "to maintain only those principles of
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law.. .proper for the protection of human rights. ... '); Republic of Arg. v. New York, 25
N.Y.2d 252, 259, 250 N.E.2d 698, 701, 303 N.Y.S.2d 644, 647 (1969) (stating that action
"in this case is mandated by the rules of international law. It is settled that... all
domestic courts must give effect to customary international law."); De Simone v.
Transportes Maritimos do Estado, 200 A.D. 82, 89, 192 N.Y.S. 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922)
("...the court has no jurisdiction and could not disregard the protest and overrule the
objection by a claim... [under] the municipal law of this State ... for by the law of nations
an adjudication.. .could not be made. . . .'); Stanley v. Ohio, 24 Ohio St. 166, 174 (1873)
(noting that the state has concern "to discharge such duties as are imposed upon it by the
law of nations"); Peters v. McKay, 195 Ore. 412, 424, 426, 238 P.2d 225, 230-31 (Ore.
1951) (".... he rule is firmly established and uniformly recognized that "International law
is part of our law and as such is the law of all States of the Union .... The rule has been
briefly stated as follows:.. .the law of nations is to be treated as part of the law of the
land. The courts of all nations judicially notice this law, and it must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination....' 30 AM. JUR.,
International Law, p. 178, at 7 .... In essence, the rule appears to be that international
law is part of the law of every state which is enforced by its courts without any
constitutional or statutory act of incorporation by reference, and. . .relevant provisions of
the law of nations are legally paramount whenever international rights and duties are
involved before a court having jurisdiction to enforce them."); see also Ex parte Bushnell, 9
OHIO ST. 77, 189 (1859) ('The constitution of the United States was framed.. .subordinate
to, and without violating the fundamental law of nations.... .'); Siplyak v. Davis, 276 Pa.
49, 52, 119 A. 745, 746 (1923) (".. .where the general law of nations and those of foreign
commerce say the contrary.. .I very much question the power or authority of any state or
nation... to pass such a law...," quoting Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 536
(1867)). Further, their references to cases and opinions using phrases "laws of the United
States," "law of the land," and "our law" are incomplete and potentially misleading.
Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 823, 834 n.125, 850-51 with PAUST,
supra note,18, at 6, 34-36, 40-43, 47; United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 299
n.*, 27 F. Cas. 713 (No. 16,122) (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) ("law of nations is part of the law of the
United States'); id. at 298 (Wilson, J., declaring that the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction "in cases like the present" and Congress can nevertheless provide a
concurrent jurisdiction in lower federal courts). Concerning the language "in Pursuance
thereof' in Article VI of the Constitution, compare Bradley, supra note 18, at 43.
With respect to the nature of customary international law, they state incorrectly
that the dissenter view is the "prevailing view," compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note
67, at 857 n.275 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 14-18, that the only participants
concerning its formation and meaning are states, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 67, at 838 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 1-3, 10-14, that state "consent" is the basis
of customary law, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 838 with PAUST, supra
note 18, at 10-17, 28; J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 51-52 (6th ed. 1963), that it does
not specify how obligations must be treated within domestic legal processes, compare
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 819 n.19 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 198-203,
212, 256, 259-64 passim, and that it was antithetical for customary legal rights of
individuals, especially human rights, to obtain against states, especially against one's own
state, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 822 (quoting incorrect and
incomplete list of alleged categories of customary international laws), 831 & n.106, 828,
839-42 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 8, 44, 198-203, 209-10, 256-70, 288-91, 323-25, 329
passim; see also supra note 22. Others have also recently confused the supposed lack of
direct remedies of individuals at the international level prior to World War II (they
existed, but were rare-see PAUST, supra note 18, at 290-91; see also PAUST, supra note
18, at 274-75; supra note 22), with a lack of individual rights under international law.
See, e.g., David P. Kunstle, Kadic v. Karadzic: Do Private Individuals Have Enforceable
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not surprising.
With increasing interdependence currently thrust upon us and a
predictable growth in international adjudication of disputes, domestic
Rights and Obligations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
319, 321-23, 337 (1995); cf id. at 339-41. Concerning several of the points made in this
paragraph, see also Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of
Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.147 (1995/96).
Additional errors include their statement that the only appropriate "sovereigns"
are either the federal government or the states, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note
67, at 852 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 171-72, 194, 328-31, 347-49, 353, 469-70, that
only one court of appeal ever addressed whether the President is bound, compare Bradley
& Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 845 & n.199 with PAUST, supra note 18, at 155 nn.8-9 &
13-14, 158-59 nn.28 & 31 & 36-37, 161 n.61, 164 n.68, and that Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) "actually denied that all of CIL was enforceable federal
law" and "did not consider international law to be part of the law of the United States"
compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 860 with 376 U.S. at 425, 428, 430 n.34;
Jordan J. Paust, letter, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 601 (1978). Finally, The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900), was interpreted improperly (especially with respect to the actual
position of the United States before the Court and the ruling that the Executive actions
were in violation of the law of nations, invalidated, and redressable in our courts, compare
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 842-43 & n.177, 845 n.199, 849 with PAUsr, supra
note 18, at 92-95, 146, 148-50, 161-64, and the split in authorities concerning the primacy
of custom over a federal statue was not adequately addressed. Concerning the split and
authorities, compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 67, at 843 with PAUST, supra note
18, at 38-39, 88-95, 120-23, 138-41. Concerning The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388
(1815), addressed in Bradley, supra, see PAUST, supra note 18, at 128-29. Concerning
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814), addressed in Bradley, supra, see
PAUST, supra note 18, at 123-24, 144-45, 156. 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 691, 692 (1802) addressed
only the issue whether CIL should be directly incorporable for criminal sanctions ("doubt
the competence. . ., there being no statute recognizing the offence .. "). On this issue, see
PAUST, supra note 18, at 7, 44-45.
Professor Bradley states that there are no 19th Century cases actually
invalidating a presidential or congressional act. Bradley, supra -his text near n.56-.
But see PAUST, supra note 18, at 138 n.96 (1892 case). This would not be surprising, since
it seems that well into the 20th Century, no one expected that the President or Congress
could even authorize a violation of CIL and nothing in the text or structure of the
Constitution would permit such a result. Actually, it is more telling that there were no
cases holding that presidential or congressional acts prevail until the mid-1980s when a
complete and unprofessional misreading of Paquete Habana occurred-all in cases
concerning the mistreatment of aliens. There are no known federal cases ruling that
states can violate CIL, but there are rare cases denying merely Supreme Court
jurisdiction to review state rulings, a denial that is no longer authoritative. Further, in
the 20th Century, there are cases allowing CIL to prevail against Executive acts, see
PAUST, supra note 18, at 146, 149, 163-64, and congressional legislation, see PAUST, supra
note 18, at 138-39, 141. As my treatise documents, with respect to presidential powers,
rulings concerning similar claims (e.g., concerning acts of lower officials and alleged
orders or approval of the President) are near rulings, and overwhelming patterns of
expectation have long supported these results, see Paust, supra note 18, at 88, 124-25,
143-46, 154-60. During discussions at the law school colloquium, Professor Bradley
assured that he is no enemy of customary international law and indicated that he was not
opposed to its use indirectly as an aid to interpret other laws, which happens to be the
most common use of customary international law. See PAUST, supra note 18, at 62, 94,
193, 212-13 passim.
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utilization of the decisions and advisory opinions of the International
Court is likely to increase.72 Not to be cute, but to provide appropriate
recognition, law school curricula should reflect an increasing global
interdependence in all sectors of public life, both civil and criminal. 73 In
that regard, the University of Denver, with the guiding and always kind
and enthusiastic participation of Professor Ved Nanda, is surely within
the forefront.
Appendix I
I.C.J. Decisions and Advisory Opinions Cited in Federal Courts
1949 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J.
4 (Apr. 9).
1949 Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178-79, 181 (Apr. 11).
1950 Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South West
Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (Jul. 11).
1951 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23
(May 28).
1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v.
Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 132, 138-39 (Dec. 18).
1952 Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in
Morocco (France v. United States), 1952 I.C.J. 176, 188-89 (Aug. 27).
1955 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4,
13, 22, 23-24, 26 (Apr. 6).
1959 Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States), 1959 I.C.J.
6, 26-27 (Mar. 21).
72. See also Justice O'Connor, supra note 71, at 18 ("there is great potential for our
Court to learn from the experience and logic of foreign courts and international
tribunals.... ."). I am surprised that there is apparently only one direct reference to the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT). See United States v. Koreh, 59 F.3d
431, 440 (3d Cir. 1995) (referencing denaturalization); see also Hirota v. MacArthur, 338
U.S. 197, 212 n.12 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring in 1949) (quoting "the Nuremberg
Tribunal" with respect to the principle nullum crimen sine lege, and the fact that it does
not obviate jurisdiction over, or prosecution of, crimes that were crimes under
international law at the time of commission, as well as the fact that the principle was
used similarly in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East); for references to
the IMT for the Far East ...., see also id. at 199, 209, 211-15; Jordan J. Paust, Nullum
Crimen and Related Crimes, 25 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 321 (1997).
I expect that with increasing use of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals
for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the long awaited creation of a permanent
International Criminal Court, as well as several regional international criminal courts,
citations to decisions of international criminal tribunals in U.S. cases will also increase.
73. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL
COURTS, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 394, 395-96 (1997) (book review).
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1970 Barcelona Traction Light & Power Company, Limited
(Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 4, 32, 33, 38-39, 42 (Feb. 5).
1971 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 118-19,
124, 131 (June 21).; id. Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun, at 76
1974 Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France) 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec.
20); (New Zealand v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20).
1980 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran (United States v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 28, 44, 200 (May 24);
and id.1979 Provisional Measures Order (15 Dec. 1979), 1979 I.C.J. 7,
19
1984 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area (Canada v. United States), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
1986 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 14, 146,
149, 183 (June 27).
1988 Advisory Opinion on Applicability of the Obligation to
Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters
Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 3 (Mar. 9).
Appendix II
P.C.I.J. Decisions Cited in Federal Courts
S.S. Wimbleton, 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 1, at 25.
German Interest in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No.
7.
S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18-
19, 23, 25.
The Factory at Chorzow (Indemnity), 1928 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 17,
at 46- 48.
Serbian Loans, P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 14 and Nos. 20-21, at 32-41.
Brazilian Loans, P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) Nos. 15 and 20.
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), 1933
P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 53, at 71-73.
Oscar Chinn, 1934 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 63, at 87.
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